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CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

IX. SOCIOLOGY AS THE DIVISION OF LABOR.

THE excellent work of Professor Émile Durkheim, of the University of Bordeaux, on the division of social labor¹ obviates the necessity of entering into a detailed consideration of this subject. He has treated it from the historical, the economic, and the sociological points of view, and has not neglected the important biological aspect of the physiological division of labor. He admits that the ancients entertained the conception and cites a line from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, but he does not point out how near Plato came in his *Laws* to formulating the whole principle.² He credits the modern doctrine to Adam Smith without qualification, and does not show how much of it he borrowed from Ferguson.³ He also properly credits Comte with being the first to show that the law has a much broader significance than the economists supposed. It is, in fact, essentially a sociological law. But M. Durkheim has expanded it until at his hands it becomes virtually coextensive with sociology itself. The economists have sufficiently lauded the subject, so that both Comte⁴ and Mill⁵ have admitted that its importance has been sometimes overestimated. Certain extremes to which it is often carried, and evils which it thereby causes to social welfare, have been sufficiently emphasized, and M. Durkheim has not overlooked this aspect of the subject.

¹ ÉMILE DURKHEIM, *De la division du travail social: Étude sur l'organisation des sociétés supérieures*, Paris, 1893.

² Εκ δὲ τούτων πλείωτε εἰς ἓν γίνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη. — PLATO'S *Republic*, 370, C.

³ ADAM FERGUSON, *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767. See the seventh edition, 1814, pp. 305, 306, 364 ff. Ferguson, who was a friend of Adam Smith, generously conceded to him all the merit of discovering this principle.

⁴ *Philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, pp. 429, 430.

⁵ JOHN STUART MILL, "Chapters on Socialism," *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. XXXI, April 1, 1879, p. 520.

As illustrating M. Durkheim's large claims for the division of labor, we may note his remark on p. 375 that "in determining the principal cause of the progress of the division of labor we have determined at the same time the essential factor in what we call civilization." I long ago defined material civilization as "the utilization of the materials and forces of nature." I always recognized, however, the immaterial or spiritual element in civilization as distinct from this, but not independent of it, and indeed as realizable only in a very slight degree without it. The spiritual life of man may be regarded as a function of his physical life, and only capable of a high development when the latter has reached a certain stage at which the higher psychic attributes are liberated and allowed to act. The division of labor, therefore, as a factor in civilization must depend upon the degree to which it contributes to the utilization by man of the materials and forces of nature. For my own part I look upon invention and labor as the chief factors, and the division of labor as simply the natural and necessary method spontaneously adopted for economizing the results of invention and labor. This does not, however, detract from its importance, and if anyone is capable of imagining a series of inventions looking to the production of material goods such as has taken place, and the amount of labor necessary, with the aid of those inventions, to produce the goods, all going on throughout human history without any division or specialization of that labor, such a one is in position to apotheosize the division of labor. It is, however, rather to be regarded as a part of the invention, viz., the devising of a method of economical labor. And if it is no more than nature has always done in the physiological division of labor, this is only one more of the innumerable instances of the identity in the mode of operation of instinct and reason in accomplishing the same economical result. Indeed, it might be shown that the chasm between physiological and social division of labor is not as wide as it seems, and that, on the one hand, the higher animals seem to exercise a modicum of reason, while, on the other, the lowest human races have been guided to the little that they have applied the principle by something closely approaching an instinct.

And still all this does not derogate from the value of the social division of labor. Looked at as such, and not merely as an economic device for the more rapid production of wealth, it means nothing less in its fullest application than that each member of society is in reality always working for every other member, while, on the other hand, every other member is always working for him. This is the sociological statement of the law, which is the prime factor at least in the production of social solidarity. Its economic aspects have been sufficiently dwelt upon.

X. SOCIOLOGY AS IMITATION.

It would scarcely be supposed *a priori* that imitation could be worked up into a system of sociology, yet M. Gabriel Tarde has accomplished this feat. In his fine series of books, *The Laws of Imitation* (1890), *Social Logic* (1895), and *Universal Opposition* (1897), not to speak of several others making collateral applications of his principles or summarizing them, he has made imitation the corner-stone of a philosophical edifice that is remarkable in many respects. As a system of sociology it is too well known to need exposition. The idea of imitation as a social factor is, of course, not new. Schopenhauer declared that history made a false claim in pretending to be always telling different things,

when it, from beginning to end, is only constantly repeating the same thing under other names and another garb. The true philosophy of history consists, then, in the view that in all these endless changes and their confusion we have continually before us only the same unchangeable essence which is the same today as yesterday and always. It should thus recognize the identity in all the events of ancient as well as of modern times, of the East as well as of the West, and, in spite of all the differences in the special circumstances, in the costumes and the modes, it should perceive everywhere the same humanity.¹

Leibnitz characterized human progress as a psittacism.² Comte on several occasions indulged in profound remarks bearing on the general subject. Speaking of the laws of mechanics as typical of the order of nature, he says:

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, third edition (Leipzig, 1859), p. 506.

² Cf. DE GREEF, *Le transformisme social* (Paris, 1895), p. 336.

Positivism represents each one of them as the necessary germ of a greater law which belongs to all the phenomena of activity, although at first it may seem to be limited to those of motion. Thus Kepler's law becomes a particular case of the law of persistence which reigns everywhere and whence are derived, for example, habit in living beings and the conservative instinct in society. In the same way Galileo's law is connected with the general law which always reconciles the action of the parts with the existence of the whole, and from which there results in sociology the fundamental harmony between order and progress.¹

In his chapter on the "Positive Theory of Human Language" he does ample justice to imitative expression (*expression mimique*) as the initial step, and traces it up through imagination, art, music, poetry, and prose.² Miss Sarah E. Simons has recently called attention³ to the fact that both Bagehot and Sir Henry Maine anticipated Tarde in many of his leading ideas. N. K. Michailovsky in a work first published in Russian⁴ in 1882, entitled *The Heroes and the Crowd*, goes over much of the ground of Tarde's works, and anticipates a large amount of what has been said by Le Bon and others relative to the collective mind. But this is, to all who do not read Russian, a sealed book as yet.

It is not, then, the idea of imitation as an important social factor newly launched by M. Tarde upon the world that justifies its treatment here; it is only because he has so expanded—I had almost said, exaggerated—the conception as to make it embrace a complete system of sociology that it merits such treatment. When he says that "society is imitation, and imitation is a species of somnambulism;"⁵ that "the result of imitations is the only thing that interests history, and is its true definition;"⁶ that "the supreme law of imitation seems to be its tendency toward an indefinite progression;"⁷ that "science consists in considering any reality under these three aspects: repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations,"⁸ he has opened a field so large that it

¹ *Politique positive*, Vol. I, p. 494.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, chap. iv.

³ AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for May, 1901, Vol. VI, pp. 818, 819.

⁴ *Heroi i Tolpa, Russkoe Bogatstvo*, 1882; republished in his collection of essays entitled *Sochineniya*, Vol. II, 1896, pp. 95-190.

⁵ *Lois de l'imitation*, 2^e édition, p. 95.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 395.

⁸ *Lois sociales*, p. 10.

is entitled to be called a system of philosophy. The latitude he gives to the terms "imitation," "repetition," "opposition," and "invention" makes it in fact a cosmic philosophy. Still, his point of view is always sociological or psychological, and, as in the case of Bagehot, we are surprised to see how many cosmic laws can be seized, as it were, by their tops, and clearly formulated in terms that are intelligible to those chiefly familiar with the sciences lower in the natural scale. This is what M. Tarde has done. His terminology is strictly sociological and psychological, and therefore his philosophy seems to be wholly new. It is not until the homologues of his leading terms are found in the other sciences that it is seen that the laws and principles are all thoroughly well known, but rarely had anyone perceived that these physical, chemical, and biological laws hold true of mind and society.

M. Tarde has not wholly neglected to point out these homologies, but he has never brought them all together in one place or attempted to arrange them systematically. He occasionally throws them in incidentally in a manner to convey to the reader the impression that he first arrived at his principles as exemplified in the most complex phenomena, and that their application in the less complex fields occurred to him in the progress of his thinking and writing, and were noted as they were perceived and used as illustrations. It is in his little work on the *Social Laws*, published in 1898, an English translation of which has appeared in America,¹ that the principal correlations of the kind here considered have been made. It is here that he says:

After these lengthy preliminaries, the time has come when it would be in place to set forth the general laws governing imitative repetition, which are to sociology what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics.²

In a footnote on p. 28 of the *Laws of Imitation*, 1895, he mentions the resemblance of imitation to heredity, and on p. 159 of the same work we find rather vague allusions to physical correlations; but his statement in his *Logique sociale* (p. 123), that

¹ G. TARDE, *Social Laws: An Outline of Sociology*, translated from the French by Howard C. Warren, etc., New York, 1899.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 61 (p. 52 of the French edition).

imitation corresponds exactly with memory, and is, in fact, social memory, shows that he had then (1895) scarcely gone below the psychologic plane, and even here had imperfectly seized the relation, since the psychologic homologue of imitation is rather what Professor James so happily terms "the stream of thought," which takes the place in modern psychology of the old, obsolete notion of "states of consciousness." In a review of the *Social Laws*,² in which Tarde's whole system was more or less fully considered from the present point of view, I pointed out what I regard as the homologues of his leading terms in physics and biology. They only need be stated here. Thus, the cosmic homologue of imitation (which involves repetition) is causation, while its biologic homologue is heredity; the cosmic or physical homologue of opposition is collision, and its biologic homologue is the environment; the cosmic homologue of invention is evolution, of which variation, the biologic homologue, is only a special case. The product of the co-operation of heredity with the environment is variation, and the product of the co-operation of causation and collision is evolution. In the same sense the product of the co-operation of imitation and opposition is invention. Adaptation merely expresses the direction that evolution, variation, and invention shall take, and the limits of their possible action. It is the same in all departments of nature, and is the synthesis of all the forces involved. They are all, working together, essentially constructive.

XI. SOCIOLOGY AS UNCONSCIOUS SOCIAL CONSTRAINT.

Quite a school of sociologists has recently arisen which holds, under varying forms and with a varying terminology, that the principal social fact is an unconscious coercion of the members of society to do, or refrain from doing, certain things. This coercion is never physical, but always moral, *i. e.*, psychic. It is mainly negative, forbidding action, but is also often positive, requiring action. Its earliest and best-known form is that which is called by Spencer "ceremonial government," a clear

¹ WILLIAM JAMES, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1890), Vol. I, pp. 224 ff.

² *Science*, New Series, Vol. XI, February 16, 1900, pp. 260-63.

definition of which is given in the first paragraph of his *Ceremonial Institutions*, a work which contains so many illustrations of the principle as applied to uncivilized races that no time need be spent in discussing this aspect of it.

That something similar to ceremonial government exists among civilized peoples has also been more or less clearly perceived, but rarely has this relation been pointed out. As in the case of superstitions among moderns who look upon the scarcely worse superstitions of both ancient and savage peoples as something gross and absurd, so the ceremonial government that exists in the most enlightened communities is not recognized as such, and is usually accepted simply as a matter of course. But keen analyzers of human nature perceive that all men at all times are hedged about by a social code which, though unwritten, is as binding as the most rigid statute laws. Dr. Carpenter says :

While the early Habits are thus in a great degree determined for each individual by the *family* influences under which he is brought up, he soon comes under those *social* influences which in a great degree shape the future course of his Mental life, constituting that *aggregate* which was designated by the Greeks as the *Nómos*. This term (sometimes translated "custom" and sometimes "law") may be considered as expressing the *custom which has the force of law*, and which is often far less easily changed than any written law; becoming so completely ingrained in the Constitution of a People or Class, as to constitute a "second nature," which only a long course of the "discipline of circumstances" can alter.¹

If the action lies clearly within the sphere of duty, it is characterized as "moral," and actions of this class are well understood to be subject to the moral law. But perhaps a majority of the actions that are performed from this sort of impersonal compulsion are morally indifferent, and for these there is no name. Mr. Spencer says :

A further component of the ethical consciousness, and often the largest component, is the represented *opinion* of other individuals, who also, in one sense, constitute an authority and exercise a coercion. This, either as actually implied in others' behavior, or as imagined if they are not present, commonly serves more than anything else to restrain or impel. How large a component this is, we see in a child who blushes when wrongly suspected

¹ WILLIAM B. CARPENTER, *Principles of Mental Physiology*, etc. (New York, 1875), p. 362.

of a transgression, as much as when rightly suspected; and probably most have had proof that, when guiltless, the feeling produced by the conceived reprobation of others is scarcely distinguishable from the feeling which would be produced by such reprobation if guilty. That an imagined public opinion is the chief element of consciousness in cases where the acts ascribed or committed are intrinsically wrong, is shown when this imagined or expressed opinion refers to acts which are not intrinsically wrong. The emotion of shame ordinarily accompanying some gross breach of social convention which is morally indifferent, or even morally praiseworthy (say wheeling home the barrow of a costermonger who has lamed himself), may be quite as strong as the emotion of shame which follows the proved utterance of an unwarranted libel—an act intrinsically wrong.¹

Professor James quotes Darwin's fine analysis of this subject from the physiological point of view, to which he appends the following footnote:

"The certainty that we are well dressed," a charming woman has said, "gives us a peace of heart compared to which that yielded by the consolations of religion is as nothing."²

Thoreau somewhere speaks of the sense of shame he experienced in coming in from a ramble with dust on his shoes and clothes, and meeting his well-dressed townsmen, who were mentally incapable of appreciating his love of nature. I am myself very sensitive to the violation of proprieties, and often, contrary to all my reasoning about it, on coming in by daylight from a botanical excursion, carrying the insignia of my *Fach*, and looking rude and uncouth as the effects of a long jaunt in the woods, I have suffered excruciating agony over the fear, and sometimes the fact, of meeting someone who knew me and could but wonder at my plight. This irrational slavery to social propriety is no doubt a serious obstacle to the study and enjoyment of nature, and naturalists and artists adopt all sorts of devices to overcome it. Only by making an outing fashionable, or by accomplishing it in a fashionable way, can the evil be avoided; hence regular outing habits and neatly made apparatus for work. Sketching is perfectly *en règle*, and my botanical portfolio was a godsend, because with it I was supposed to be sketching. Skilled labor, too, is respectable, and when

¹ *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 336, 337.

² WILLIAM JAMES, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1890), Vol. II, p. 431.

geologizing around cities my geological hammer is my passport, because I am always repairing telegraph wires—an illusion that I am careful not to dispel.

But the principle is still broader than the illustrations thus far given would imply. M. Durkheim has identified it with social constraint, and defines the principal social fact as “any mode of action capable of exercising an external constraint upon an individual; or which is general throughout a given society having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations;”¹ and he further says that “a social fact is recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals.”²

M. Fouillée uses the expression “collective determinism”³ for practically the same principle, which would be excellent but for a certain ambiguity in the word “determinism,” and its much more frequent use as the other of free will.

The expression “social imperative” seems to have been first used by Professor Ludwig Stein, of the University of Bern.⁴ It is among the happiest contributions to sociological terminology. It is naturally affiliated upon Kant's categorical imperative, which covers all cases of ethical or moral action, and it may be extended to take in all the fields of unconscious or impersonal constraint not coming under the categorical imperative. It is, therefore, rather to be regretted that Professor Stein should divide it up and enumerate other alleged imperatives, such as religious, political, juridical, artistic, scientific, etc.⁵ These are

¹ ÉMILE DURKHEIM, *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* (Paris, 1895), p. 19.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

³ ALFRED FOUILLÉE, *Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde* (Paris, 1896), p. 242.

⁴ As this expression was being freely used in America without indication of source, I wrote to Professor Stein early in 1899 to ask him when he had first used it. In his reply, dated April 18, 1899, he says: “I have been using the expression ‘social imperative’ (*socialer Befehl*) in my lectures for the past ten years, but only published it in my *Archiv für Philosophie* in 1896.” In the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for September, 1896, Vol. II, p. 257, Dr. Ross uses this expression. In conversation with him he was unable to give the source, and said it must have then been “in the air.”

⁵ *Revue internationale de sociologie*, V^e année, janvier 1897, pp. 62, 63.

all social imperatives, if they are imperatives at all in this sense, *i. e.*, unconscious and impersonal influences determining conduct. In his large work¹ Professor Stein has formulated the social imperative, partially paraphrasing the language of Kant's celebrated rule of conduct, as follows:

So act as, in each of thy actions, to strengthen not only thine own life, but at the same time that of thy fellow-men, but especially to insure and to elevate that of future generations.

The conception which we are considering also includes all that Dr. Ross has denominated "social control,"² as well as the co-ordinate phenomena which he calls "social influence," the two together constituting "social ascendancy."³ Although he says that social control is "purposive and at its inception conscious," still in reading his book we see that he is dealing as much with unconscious and impersonal forces as do ceremonial government and social imperatives. Dr. Ross has written a book that is at once brilliant and profound. It fairly sparkles with happy phrases, quaint words, and pat illustrations, and deals with a recondite subject in a scholarly and masterly way. His style as well as his theme recalls Tarde's works, but he never causes the reader to lose the main thread in a maze of illustrations and digressions. He has laid all history, science, and philosophy under tribute, and writes with all the ease and grace of a Macaulay. This work, which consists of a series of papers previously published in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, now brought together, revised, and expanded, is probably the most important contribution thus far made to the genesis and essential nature of social order. When he says, "the truth just coming into focus, that *all groups and organs constantly exercise manifold cohesive pressures and attractions upon their units*, is a discovery of the first order, and cannot fail to influence the future of social science,"⁴ he sounds a clear note, and one

¹ *Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1897), p. 705.

² EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order*, New York, 1901.

³ See this JOURNAL, Vol. I, p. 519; also *Social Control*, preface, pp. vii, viii.

⁴ This JOURNAL, Vol. III, p. 822.

that is in perfect harmony with the sociological thought of today. It is a paradox that the things that are most familiar are the least perceived, and these silent powers that make for social order, like the air we breathe, because they press equally in all directions, are not felt. It required a Priestley to discover them in the sociological laboratory. Further researches in this fruitful direction will doubtless carry the principle back toward the biological plane and show that a large part of social control is or once was a true social selection, and that much of the spirit of submission to social imperatives has become constitutional through a long process of elimination of the unfit, *i. e.*, the unsocial. It is beginning to be seen that the moral code, conformity to which has always seemed to depend upon the free will of the agent, is really, when broadly interpreted, self-enforcing, and now we are brought to realize that the conventional code also is self-enforcing, and that social as well as moral action is determined.

XII. SOCIOLOGY AS THE STRUGGLE OF RACES.

I will terminate this enumeration of the principal systems of sociology with a brief reference to the doctrine of the struggle of races. I do not put this last because I regard it of less importance than the others, nor is the brevity of the treatment due to any disposition to disparage the doctrine. On the contrary, so far as the claim is concerned to the merit of really constituting sociology, I regard this principle, when seen in its full extent, with all its collateral implications, as coming much nearer to the establishment of this claim than any single one of those that have been considered. This is the ground of my apparent neglect of it here. It forms so large a part of my own conception of sociology that it will be necessary to deal with it extensively elsewhere. It opens up in the only satisfactory way the whole question of the origin and, through this, of the true nature of society itself.

To Professor Ludwig Gumplowicz is due the merit of having brought this subject fully and squarely before the world. Of course, as in all such movements of human thought, earlier writers had given out more or less distinct adumbrations of the

idea. Hobbes's notion of a universal struggle scarcely ranks as such an adumbration. Heraclitus came much nearer to it when he said that war was the mother of all things. The struggle for existence in the animal world, which results in evolution, is the biological starting-point for the discussion of all such questions, but natural selection, the principle underlying that movement, is not the sociological principle here involved. Mr. Spencer has often worked dangerously close to this conception, but he can scarcely be said to have formulated it. Bagehot, who scented so many later accepted truths, saw some of the latest consequences of the race struggle when he said:

The beginning of civilization is marked by an intense legality; that legality is the very condition of its existence, the bond which ties it together; but that legality—that tendency to impose a settled customary yoke upon all men and all actions—if it goes on, kills out the variability implanted by nature, and makes different men and different ages facsimiles of other men and other ages, as we see them so often. Progress is only possible in those happy cases where the force of legality has gone far enough to bind the nation together, but not far enough to kill out all varieties and destroy nature's perpetual tendency to change.¹

Primarily in his *Rassenkampf* (1883),² but also in other, chiefly later works (*Grundriss der Sociologie*, 1885; *Sociologie und Politik*, 1892; *Sociologische Staatsidee*, 1892; second edition, 1902; *Allgemeines Staatsrecht*, 1897, which he calls a revised edition with changed title of his early *Philosophisches Staatsrecht*, 1877), Gumplowicz has been ringing the changes on this, his favorite idea, until it seems to have almost become with him an *idée fixe*. But a great idea is worth repeating any number of times, provided the iteration does not ultimately dull, instead of sharpening, the reader's wits. In this case the slow progress of the idea, due in part to that unfortunate misomimetism of the world's élite, partly to the absorption of every sociological thinker in his own pet idea, and partly, in this case, it is to be feared, to a certain pungency, satire, and impatience with the ideas of others, that characterize the author's style, seemed to

¹ *Physics and Politics*, p. 64.

² The theory was clearly formulated by him eight years earlier in a pamphlet entitled: *Race und Staat. Eine Untersuchung über das Gesetz der Staatenbildung* (Wien, 1875), 58 pp., 8vo.

further justify persistent exposition. The attention, however, of a few sociologists has been arrested by this array of books, and Roncali, Vanni, and Vaccaro, in Italy, and Ratzenhofer in Austria, have made it the subject of more or less serious consideration. Novicow, of Odessa, has written a book on the struggles among societies,¹ but he does not treat the subject from the same point of view, and indeed cannot be said to be dealing with the same subject at all. Gumplowicz is not mentioned. Vaccaro² does, indeed, treat the subject, somewhat as a critic, pointing out certain limitations to the doctrine, and suggesting some wholesome modifications of Gumplowicz's more extreme positions, but scarcely advancing the general stock of truth with regard to it. Ratzenhofer, however, to some extent in his large work,³ but especially in his later and more philosophical work,⁴ has worked up fairly abreast of the subject and has greatly illumined all the more obscure parts of it. This work is profoundly philosophical as well as scientific and classical, and constitutes one of the most important contributions that have been made to sociology during the past decade. Ratzenhofer shows the precise *modus operandi* of the whole process of social assimilation through successive subjugations, and works out every step in the long train of consequences, bringing about, one after another, in a uniform (unilateral) order the several social conditions: conquest, caste, inequality, law, the state, the people, and the nation. Although this is not all of social assimilation,⁵ it covers so large a part of it, explaining all the older civilizations and holding true for all the present leading

¹ J. NOVICOW, *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines*, Paris, 1896.

² MICHEL-ANGE VACCARO, *Le Basi del Diritto e dello Stato*, 1893; French translation, *Les bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état*, Paris, 1898.

³ GUSTAV RATZENHOFER, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik als Theil der Sociologie und Grundlage der Staatswissenschaften*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1893.

⁴ *Die sociologische Erkenntnis: Positive Philosophie des socialen Lebens*, Leipzig, 1898.

⁵ I take pleasure in calling attention to the able papers of Miss Sarah E. Simons on this subject that recently appeared in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for May, July, September, and November, 1901, and January, 1902. These papers are written in an enlightened spirit and suggest a line of sociological study of the greatest promise.

nations of Europe, that it furnishes the key to the great bulk of all the phenomena of human history, and constitutes the most comprehensive principle at work in social evolution. It furnishes the first scientific, or in the least satisfactory, theory that has been advanced as to the origin and true constitution of the state, so that, after grasping this principle in its entirety, all the old notions about the state become rubbish, and any work on the nature of the state that does not recognize and start from this standpoint—and such are still constantly appearing—is superficial and practically worthless. But the temptation to go farther into the interior of this fertile field must be resisted.

I have now enumerated and briefly discussed twelve of the leading sociological conceptions or unitary principles that have been put forward with large claims in the case of each to being in and of itself the science of sociology. There are others, but these papers have assumed undue length, and it becomes necessary to bring them to a close. Any one of these views might be, and most of them have been, set forth in such a way that, considered alone, it would seem to justify this claim. It is hoped that the imperfect treatment that I have been able to give to them all may place the reader in a position to judge for himself as to the matter, and if not to weigh each one and assign it its true rank and value, at least to perceive that in the nature of things no single one of them can constitute a science. It is also hoped that enlightened minds may rise to something like a realizing sense of the vast import of sociology, for no single one of these conceptions is to be rejected. All are legitimate parts of the science, and there are many more equally weighty that remain as yet more or less unperceived.

All these various lines of investigation, together with all others that have been or shall be followed out, may be compared to so many minor streams, all flowing in a given direction and converging so as ultimately to unite in one great river that will represent the whole science of sociology, such as it is destined to become when the present period of social myopia shall have passed away.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.